Organizational Deviance: The Case of the Baltimore City Detention Center by Vallin, Jaz
Augsburg Honors Review
Volume 11 Article 3
2018
Organizational Deviance: The Case of the
Baltimore City Detention Center
Jaz Vallin
Augsburg University
Follow this and additional works at: https://idun.augsburg.edu/honors_review
Part of the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Idun. It has been accepted for inclusion in Augsburg Honors Review by an authorized editor
of Idun. For more information, please contact bloomber@augsburg.edu.
Recommended Citation






This paper analyzes the causes that led to the federal indictment of thirteen female guards, 
and eventual conviction of forty guards and inmates, at the Baltimore City Detention 
Center in 2013. The analysis is based on information presented in extensive newspaper 
coverage during and after the discovery of the events and the behavior at the jail. While 
popular opinion in the press blamed the guards’ gender or their personal morals for their 
actions, the incident can best be explained through the use of organizational heuristic 
tools. Application of Diane Vaughan’s matrix of routine nonconformity reveals that the 
guards’ actions involved multiple layers of misconduct within an organizational setting 
and that the failures were not individual but structural. 
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 In 2013, thirteen female correctional officers at the Baltimore City Detention 
Center were indicted under federal racketeering charges. The charges against these 
officers spiraled into a minor scandal as over two dozen other officers and inmates were 
also charged. By 2015, forty people were convicted for their involvement. Speculation 
rose about how, exactly, the prison could allow the widespread corruption to happen, with 
theories blaming the gender and moral character of the guards. However, the epidemic 
of corruption can best be explained through an organizational context. Organizational 
sociologist Diane Vaughan (1999) typifies organizational deviance in one of three forms: 
mistake, misconduct, and disaster. Each of these three forms is characterized by routine 
nonconformity, or regularly-occurring deviances from the organizational norms, but 
they are differentiated by the intention of the actors involved and the level of resulting 
widespread harm. Mistakes, misconduct, and disasters are all shaped by the micro, meso, 
and macro levels of the organization in which they occur. In the case of the Baltimore City 
Detention Center, the guards’ actions were acts of misconduct, and Vaughan’s matrix of 
routine nonconformity is the best fit to explain how that misconduct occurred.
Case Analysis
The officers, along with several inmates at the Baltimore City Detention Center, were 
accused of helping the criminal gang Black Guerilla Family (BGF) “run their criminal 
enterprise in jail by smuggling cellphones, prescription pills and other contraband in their 
underwear, shoes and hair” (Marimow and Wagner 2013). The scheme was led by Tavon 
White, the gang’s leader, who was incarcerated for attempted murder and who at one 
point boasted on a wiretapped phone call that “this is my jail” (Anderson 2015). White 
led the BGF in the prison and colluded with the guards, even impregnating five of them. 
Ultimately, twenty-four officers and sixteen inmates were convicted of involvement, 
and only three officers were acquitted (Jedra 2015). After the allegations came to light, 
Maryland state officials attempted to deflect blame: Senator Lisa Gladden said that the 
female guards were the problem; Secretary of Public Safety Gary D. Maynard called 
the guards involved “bad actors” (Marimow and Wagner 2013). However, both of these 
explanations fail to account for the organizational aspect of the situation. The events in 
the prison were rooted in organized crime and led to the guards participating in White’s 
racketeering scheme. While the acts were intended to conform to White’s gang and his 
standards, the guards’ status caused the general public to see them as deviants. Their 
misconduct led to the entire prison being labeled as deviant and ultimately caused the 
facility to shut down.
 The BGF, a highly structured organized crime gang, was founded in the 1960s in 
California, but has expanded to operate in major U.S. cities and prisons across the nation 
(Marimow and Wagner 2013). Tavon White’s position within the gang is indicative of 
internal organization: he is “allegedly a high-ranking ‘bushman’ in the Black Guerilla 
Family” (Vargas, Marimow, and Shin 2013). White also organized the internal structure 
of the prison so that he was on top. He created a money laundering and racketeering 
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operation, complete with an appointed “minister of finance,” and said at one point that 
“‘I make every final call in this jail… everything come[s] to me’” (Vargas, et al.:2013). 
White leveraged his personal charisma and his long stay in the prison to restructure the 
prison. Rather than existing as a regular inmate, he organized the internal hierarchy and 
put himself on top.
 White’s organized crime operation within the prison provided the backdrop 
for the misconduct committed by the guards. Misconduct can be defined as “acts of 
omission or commission by individuals or groups acting in their organizational roles 
who violate internal rules, laws or administrative regulations on behalf of organizational 
goals” (Vaughan 1999:287). The case initially charged thirteen guards at the prison, but 
these charges were later expanded to twenty-seven guards (Jedra 2015). These guards 
were acting on the behalf of two organizations: the formal prison and the informal 
gang. They leveraged their roles within the the prison in order to improve their standing 
with White and the BGF. In essence, they violated the rules of the prison and of their 
jobs on behalf of the goals of the illicit organization. The guards’ offenses ranged from 
smuggling contraband into prison to having sexual relations with inmates to warning 
inmates before their cells were searched (Marimow and Wagner 2013). In return, 
all of the guards were paid, allowed to drive cars belonging to the gang, and several 
of them entered relationships with White (Marimow and Wagner 2013). The guards 
violated the rules of the prison while simultaneously following the rules of the BGF. 
This combination of conformity and nonconformity resulted ultimately in the guards 
committing misconduct.
 Within Albert Reiss’s (1984) typology of labeling organizational deviance, 
the actions of the guards resulted in the entire prison being labeled deviant. While the 
corruption was not universal, it was widespread enough that the guards’ corruption 
came to symbolize a corrupt prison as a whole. The prison remained open, but several 
of the guards were transferred to other prisons because they were labeled as “dirty” 
(Washington Post 2013). After his election in 2015, Maryland Governor Larry Hogan 
announced that he would be closing the prison, calling the entire incident “one of the 
biggest failures of leadership in the history of Maryland” (Connelly 2015). Hogan did 
not acknowledge the guards who were not complicit in the racketeering, stating only 
that the prisoners would be transferred to other facilities in the state. While the involved 
guards were convicted individually, the entire facility suffered the consequences of their 
actions. Hogan demolished the prison in 2016 and has not yet announced plans to build 
a replacement facility (Cox and George 2017). The complete history and faculty of the 
prison were tainted by the actions of the guards involved with the BGF.
The guards’ misconduct and participation in organized crime led to the Baltimore City 
Detention Center being labeled as deviant. Forty of the forty-four individuals charged in 
the case were convicted, and the prison was closed and demolished. The organizational 
foci on crime led to a more comprehensive understanding of the events that took place 
within the prison. The context of both of the organizations involved shines a new light 




After the indictment was made public, the prison was heavily criticized for allowing 
women to serve as guards. Senator Lisa Gladden argued that “‘when you hire and seek 
women to handle men, you get all sorts of crazy stuff … you cannot allow women to 
get involved with these men, or you’re going to get what you’re going to get’” (Duncan 
2013). However, in 2013, more than 60% of prison guards in Baltimore were women 
(Dvorak 2013). The problem was not that the guards were women; rather, the problem 
was the power imbalance. Women have the same capacity as men to wield their power 
dangerously, and while “‘there’s an assumption that women won’t [abuse their power], 
can’t do this, that it’s not in our nature … but it’s in our nature’” (Dvorak 2013). While 
women statistically commit fewer crimes than men, “the notion that women are more 
ethical, generous, and caring than men in the public sphere is questionable” (Dodge 
2012:92). Additionally, it is important to acknowledge that “societal structures have 
limited the types of criminal offenses committed by women” (Dodge 2012:86). Because 
the majority of prison guards in Baltimore were women who did not abuse their power, 
the gender of the guards at the detention center cannot be definitively linked to their 
misconduct. Instead, the characteristics of the organization’s structure and environment, 
and indeed the failure of both of these aspects, are the roots of the misconduct that 
occurred in the detention center.
 One of the key factors in the events at the Baltimore City Detention Center was 
the failure of regulations. The guards’ misconduct was affected by the environment in 
which it took place. When the environmental deterrence fails, Vaughan (1999) argues that 
misconduct becomes significantly easier. Complex systems such as prison hierarchies have 
failsafes in place: “a safety device, a redundancy” (Perrow 1984:6). These failsafes are part 
of the external environment and are designed to prevent misconduct and other forms of 
organizational deviance. The detention center suffered from a failure of these redundancies. 
For example, the guards were able to sneak contraband into the prison because the external 
security checkpoints did not perform their checks thoroughly: “[the guards] underwent 
pat-downs that were cursory at best, and much of the contraband, especially the drugs, did 
not trigger the metal detectors at the entrance” (Washington Post 2013). It was assumed 
that the guards would follow their duties, but in the event that they committed acts of 
misconduct, the security checkpoints existed as a redundancy. However, that regulation 
failed because of the cursory nature of the pat-downs. The checkpoints became steeped 
in familiarity and routine. That familiarity can become detrimental because it “means that 
we are not endlessly alert, ever searching for that extremely rare event [that indicates a 
system failure]” (Perrow 1984:152). The prison’s gatekeepers became too familiar with 
the process, and that prevented them from properly regulating the prison guards. This 
regulatory failure allowed the problem to spiral out of control.
 The misconduct was also worsened by the failure of institutional sanctions. 
Organizational characteristics are another key factor in determining the causes of 
organizational deviance, and the lack of sanctions is one such characteristic. The guards 
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involved in the scheme “faced no realistic prospect of punishment” (Washington Post 
2013). The majority of the guards involved were not punished, only transferred to other 
prisons. The failure to institute proper sanctions against the prison guards drew ire from 
critics, who claimed that “dirty guards should be fired, not transferred” (Washington 
Post 2013). If the guards knew that they would not be severely punished for their 
actions, the sanctions became less efficient as deterrents. This is another example of a 
redundancy failing. The threat of punishment or losing jobs should serve as a deterrent 
against deviance. Instead, the guards had an excess of autonomy, which allowed them 
to make decisions with a lessened fear of repercussion. The failure of sanctions, and the 
excess of organizational autonomy, contributed to the scheme.
Effects
The Baltimore City Detention Center was closed in 2015; two years later, it was evident 
that there were no plans to replace it (Cox and George 2017). Most of the guards were 
transferred until their trials began. One inmate died before charges could be pressed; the 
remaining twenty-four guards and sixteen inmates were convicted in the scheme (Jedra 
2015). However, at the time of the indictment, four of the guards had children with Tavon 
White, and all of the prisoners were transferred to other detention centers within the state. 
Despite the internalized nature of the crime, the actions of the guards still had victims.
 Most of the victims of the events in the detention center were third and fourth 
party victims. Third-party victims are characterized as “innocent bystanders” with no 
involvement in the system (Perrow 1984:68). While the prisoners housed at the Baltimore 
City Detention Center were not innocent, they were affected by the actions of the BGF 
and everyone involved in it. The inmates that actively participated were convicted, 
and those that did not were relocated. These uninvolved suffered the consequences of 
the misconduct of the guards and inmates. The children of the guards and White were 
fourth-party victims. Their lives were impacted by the actions of their parents, in which 
they had no say whatsoever. This deviance determined the course of their lives, and 
the effects of the BGF on them should be acknowledged. The children and the inmates 
comprise the victim population following the events at the detention center.
Evaluation
The best theoretical fit for the events in the detention center is Vaughan’s matrix of routine 
nonconformity. Vaughan’s initial typology of mistake, misconduct, and disaster makes 
it clear that the problems in the prison were misconduct: they could not have occurred 
without actions taken intentionally by the prison guards. Analyzing the environment 
and organizational characteristics provides additional context for the misconduct that 
elucidates the guards’ decisions. Gender-based theories of crime do not fit here because 
the actions taken by the female guards here are not dissimilar to actions taken by male 
52
Jaz Vallin
guards in similar positions. The administrative failures that led to the misconduct within 
the prison were criticized by journalists, by the public, and by Maryland Governor Larry 
Hogan. The lack of regulation was the strongest influence in the case of the Baltimore 
City Detention Center.
Conclusion
Vaughan’s model of routine nonconformity explains not only the actions within the 
Baltimore City Detention Center, but also how they were able to take place. The excess 
of autonomy within the prison and failure of regulation created an environment where 
deviance would not be punished. The racketeering scheme had far-reaching consequences, 
including the birth of illegitimate children and the relocation of dozens of prisoners. 
While the deviance may at a glance seem to be because of the women’s gender or 
because of their individual greed, their actions were abetted by structural characteristics 
that fostered deviance. The ultimate closure of the Baltimore City Detention Center 
and conviction of forty guards and inmates may have punished the offenders, but a 
repetition of this situation can only be avoided by examining and learning from these 
institutional failures. These organizational failures must be analyzed and eliminated in 
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